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Abstract
As a country sets a peg of its currency the monetary policy credibility it ex-
pects to gain implies that the anti-inﬂationary performance has to be as similar
as possible to the anchor country one. Failing to meet this requirement can lead
to speculative attacks against the currency parity. This is an insight drawn from
monetary policy credibility models dealing with ﬁxed exchange rates regimes.
In addition, multiple equilibria embedded in these models may cause speculative
attacks that make the eﬃciency of exchange rate regimes questionable. Con-
trary to this theoretical insight, the Franc zone continues to work despite the
disinﬂation process in the European Union which is likely to increase the level
of constraint related the use of the euro as an anchor. This paper shows how
the existence of particular arrangements in the Franc zone allows for getting a
framework without multiple equilibria and insures the stability of the system.
Moreover, two kinds of structural asymmetries relative to African economies
are introduced to show that, without the “operations account” mechanism, the
EMU advent and the unfavorable economic and political environment which
prevails in Africa are likely to have increased the constraint of pegging to the
euro.
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When a country pegs its nominal exchange rate (ER), it expects a convergence of its
inﬂation level toward that of the anchor country1. Whether the peg is a currency or a
basket of currencies, the objective is to target inﬂation reduction or control. Then,
the challenge for the pegging monetary authority is to be able to record roughly
an inﬂation level equivalent to the one of the anchor country. Otherwise, a real
appreciation can emerge and current account problems are likely to occur because
of the subsequent loss of competitiveness.
Moreover, theoretical models of anti-inﬂationary strategies that aim to gain mo-
netary policy credibility through a currency peg are characterized by the existence of
multiple equilibria. This feature causes ﬁxed exchange rates (FER) regimes to be a
source of speculative attacks due to uncertainty (Obstfeld, 1996, 1997; Rasmussen,
2002). Nevertheless, Rasmussen (2002) argues that the cost of reneging has an
inﬂuence on the stability of the system. The higher the cost of reneging, the more
stable will be the ﬁxed exchange rate setup. A monetary union appears then to be
the most stable ﬁxed exchange rates system as it implies a greater cost than other
FER regimes.
More speciﬁcally, Corden (1994) argues that for Developing Countries (DCs), the
true challenge is to reduce ﬁscal deﬁcit: “...Since, to a great extent, monetary policy
in developing countries is determined by ﬁscal policy (deﬁcits tend to be monetized
to varying extents), ﬁscal policy must adjust to exchange rate policy. To reduce the
rate of money supply growth, a ﬁscal deﬁcit will have to be reduced...”(see Corden,
1994, pg. 75). Daniel (2001) presents a ﬁscal theory of currency crises according
to which the long run viability of a FER system depends on the present value of
future ﬁscal surpluses. The monetary policymaker will abandon the exchange rate
peg when its ﬁscal policy violates the constraint imposed by a FER.
The macroeconomic policy of the potential anchor country is, then, of great in-
terest. As the disinﬂation process through exchange rate management mechanism
proceeded in the European Union (EU), low inﬂation record became the rule and
the revealed objective of monetary authorities of the former candidates and current
members of the EMU. The current objectives of the European Central Bank remain
consistent with an ever low inﬂation level record and low ﬁscal deﬁcit. Thus, the
adoption of the euro as the nominal anchor in a DC means for the policymaker to
be engaged in a ﬁscal policy pattern and in a low inﬂation performance similar to
those of the ECB. But the usual incentives to permissive ﬁscal policy and the high
inﬂation that characterize some DCs make the introduction or the sustainability of
the currency peg to the euro questionable. Accordingly, this could have increased
the probability of currency or ﬁnancial crises as the European monetary integra-
tion proceeded. The expectations of currency crises are more likely to increase as
the increasing tightness of EMU macroeconomic policies — the anchor economy —
1For a treatment of nominal and real exchange rate targeting, see Corden (1994) and Eichengreen
et al. (1999).
1makes the peg less credible.
Two facts of interest are the core motivation of this study. On the one hand,
the existing CFA zone whose unique currency is pegged to the euro has existed for
a very long time. It is expected to still exist despite the diﬀerences in ﬁscal and
inﬂation performances in comparison with the EMU and France — the CFA franc
was pegged to the French franc before the euro birth. Actually, it can be observed
that during some periods the inﬂation level in some CFA zone countries was above
that of France without any announcement of redrawing by African countries or
frequent realignments of the parity. Neither the principles of a currency peg nor the
predictions of theoretical models have worked as it might be expected.
On the other hand, Masson and Patillo (2001a) report that many other African
countries are planning to build a monetary union that would include some current
CFA zone participants. This would be a new monetary union including all but one of
country members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)2.
This project is raising some queries as both the very restrictive ECB monetary policy
and the unstable broad economic environment in Africa are likely to make the peg of
the future common currency to the euro — if it is adopted —a very heavy constraint.
To deal with these issues we build a theoretical framework based on Obstfeld
(1996) and Rasmussen (2002). While we will study in a positive approach the
functioning of a pegged currency model that characterizes the current CFA zone,
the handling of potential structural asymmetries is also an aspect of this work,
especially an asymmetric aversion to inﬂation and an asymmetric broad economic
and political environment. This work tries to show how these two asymmetries could
aﬀect the stability of a more classical CFA zone, the planned ECOWAS monetary
union or a small pegging African DC like Comoros. Therefore, one kind of reform
that could allow to better manage the implications of the considered asymmetries
is suggested. The scope of this paper is going beyond the functioning of monetary
unions in the sense that any FER arrangement can be included in the range of
frameworks to be analyzed by the means of our model.
The impact of asymmetries on monetary arrangements is largely documented in
the literature on cooperative versus non-cooperative macroeconomic policies. It was
stressed that either asymmetric shocks (see for example the Mundell (1961) seminal
work on optimal currency areas) or structural asymmetries (see for example Bednar
and Monfort (1997); Hughes Hallet and Weymark (2002)) could make a monetary
cooperation counterproductive or could endanger the stability of a monetary union.
This present model diﬀers from the existing literature in some aspects. First, rather
than dealing with the welfare analysis of the cooperative (non-cooperative) policies,
particularly the choice to join or to remain in a monetary union, our model just tack-
les the role of asymmetries in the functioning of a FER regime that encompasses
2The ECOWAS is composed of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Cape
Verde plus eight members of the West African CFA franc zone. All these countries are participants
in the project of forming a common currency pegged to the euro, except for Cape Verde. The
latter has already a currency peg to the euro, through the support of Portugal (Masson and Patillo,
2001a).
2a monetary union. The framework is an extension of an open economy credibil-
ity model initiated by Obstfeld (1996), turning out to be a simpler way to analyze
the role of asymmetries. Secondly, a new way to express a structural asymmetry
will be introduced to capture the existence of weaker broad economic and political
environments in the pegging country in comparison with those of the anchor coun-
try. Finally, for a ﬁrst attempt, the model allows to formally shape the CFA zone
operations account mechanism in a monetary model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section deals with the
current functioning of the CFA zone and points to some stylized facts that feature
some CFA zone members and non-CFA ECOWAS members in comparison with
France. The third section introduces an anti-inﬂationary policy model characterized
by multiple equilibria and uncertainty. After showing how the virtual convertibility
of the CFA franc — sustaining the ﬁxed parity — increases the stability of a currency
peg, Asymmetries are also introduced in the model in order to prove why without
a “operations account”–like mechanism, a peg to the euro could be diﬃcult to set
up as these structural factors are implying a lesser ability to stabilize employment.
The fourth section discusses the future of the franc zone in line with the current
debate around the challenge of African currencies in the presence of the euro. The
last section is a conclusion.
2 The CFA zone, the ECOWAS and Emu Advent: Em-
pirics on existing asymmetries.
Two questions can be asked: To which extent maintaining a peg to the euro can
become a matter of concern? Is the setup of a peg to the euro credible in African
DC’s? These questions lead to a prospective study on either the holding or the
settlement of a nominal peg when asymmetries exist. While maintaining a peg to
the euro is an issue related to the CFA zone which exists since the sixties, setting
up an ER regime based on a peg to the euro is related to the ECOWAS which is a
planned monetary union to be formed by some African countries and encompasses
the current West Economic African Monetary Union (WAEMU) — a part of the CFA
zone 3. In this section, after the description of the functioning of the CFA zone, we
will explore the macroeconomic performances of both the CFA and the non-CFA
members of the ECOWAS in order to highlight possible structural asymmetries that
could be inﬂuential when considering either the issue of maintaining a peg between
an African currency and the euro or that of building a ﬁxed ER regime with the
euro as the anchor. These performances are compared with the ones of France as
we invoke the European monetary integration process which is a consequence of
the European Monetary System (EMS) creation and the move from the EMS to
3The franc zone in Africa is composed of three monetary sub-zones: the West Economic African
Monetary Union (WAEMU), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC)
and the Comoros isles. The CFA zone is composed of two monetary sub-zones —the WAEMU and
the CAEMC.
3the EMU. In addition, we will consider some events that could be indicators of the
soundness of general economic and political environment in African countries. This
may be another source of asymmetry in comparison with the EMU.
2.1 CFA, ECOWAS and Disinﬂation Process in the European Union
Since the second part of the decade of the eighties, the monetary integration process
has been boosted in Europe. To fulﬁll the EMS and the Convergence criteria in
order to be eligible for the EMU participation, a disinﬂation process took place
and allowed a structural low inﬂation pattern that currently characterizes the EMU
members. It would be interesting to compare this pattern to the ones of some
African countries in order to look for a possible structural diﬀerence. We consider
the evolution of France’s inﬂation performance as a representative structural pattern
because of its importance for the CFA zone. France is not only the main trading
partner of many of the zone countries, but also the country whose currency was the
anchor. The existence of convergence criteria for non-CFA members of ECOWAS
can then be interpreted as the result of considering the anchorage of the CFA franc
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Source: IMF, IFS Cd-rom of june 2001
Figure 1: Inﬂation (%) pattern of France and a ﬁrst group of selected CFA zone countries
A ﬁrst group of selected countries includes four CFA zone members, i.e., Ivory
Coast, Gabon, Niger and Togo whose inﬂation patterns are shown in ﬁgure 1, each
in comparison to the one of France. It can be noticed that a disinﬂation process
4began in France since the beginning of the eighties. As France is characterized by
a structural low inﬂation level, the ECB monetary policy is set to allow this low
inﬂation feature to hold in the future. Furthermore, the rate of inﬂation in the
targeted CFA countries has been volatile even if a downward trend can be observed
as a consequence of originally pegging the CFA franc to the French franc and later
to the euro. In addition to this volatility there are many periods during which the
inﬂation in African countries is clearly above the French one despite the existence of
the ﬁxed ER. Of course, the converse situation also occurred, but it seems to us that
it is of less interest because a devaluation is more of concern than a reevaluation
for small country policymakers. In fact, periods of higher inﬂation in Africa —
in comparison to France — could easily be interpreted as an inclination to pursue
inﬂationary monetary policies. The devaluation that occurred in 1994 helps to
explain why there is a peak of inﬂation during that year. Since the devaluation
episode, the inﬂation has been reduced to be around the level of inﬂation in France;
the case of Ivory Coast is diﬀerent because its inﬂation performance has been worse
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FRANCE CHAD
Source: IMF, IFS Cd-rom of June 2001
Figure 2: Inﬂation (%) pattern of France and a second group of selected CFA zone countries
plus Comoros
Observing another group of countries whose inﬂation rate evolution is depicted
in ﬁgure 2, we clearly see that the inﬂation level in these African countries remained
above of the inﬂation level in France since the devaluation has occurred, except in
1999. In addition, like in the ﬁrst group case, the inﬂation rate is largely more
volatile than in France. Furthermore, there are many periods during which inﬂation
5in CFA zone countries — plus Comoros — has been above the required level to
maintain a ﬁxed ER.
It can easily be understood why African policymakers are able to avoid a deva-
luation whilst they undertake inﬂationary policies. The reason is the existence of
an institutional mechanism called operations account. As the African central banks
(for the two monetary unions and Comoros) deposit a part of their external reserves
in the so-called operations account located in the French central bank, the French
Treasury engages itself to provide for an amount of euros — formerly French francs
— in order to support external transactions of African countries. This mechanism
implies a virtual convertibility that allows African monetary authorities to keep the
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FRANCE NIGERIA
Source: IMF, IFS Cd-rom of june 2001
Figure 3: Inﬂation (%) pattern of France and a non-CFA ECOWAS countries
Observing Figure 3 which includes some non-CFA ECOWAS members is also
informative. The rate of inﬂation in these countries is structurally above the one of
France and its ﬁgure indicates the same volatility observed elsewhere in Africa.
2.2 Inﬂuential Factors of General Economic Environment
The desired credibility of a pegging policymaker is also related to its ability to
successfully manage the economic shocks that the economy will face. But, as for as
African countries are concerned, it is important to wonder whether the frequency
of negative economic shocks is comparable to those of the anchor country. In fact,
the more frequent the shocks, the less the ability to maintain a parity because the
6private agents will expect a higher probability of a devaluation designed for shock
management. Comparing the economic shocks occurrence in Africa and in EMU is
an impossible task because of the lack of data. Alternatively, we are focusing on
the study of general economic and political environments in order to highlight some
factors that will allow us to speculate about the likelihood of negative economic
shocks in Africa in comparison with the EMU.
On the side of economic factors, we ﬁrst emphasize the structure of exports
or the production of tradable goods. The African economies are characterized by
a commodity bias of export pattern. The commodity prices are volatile and the
production of this kind of goods is highly correlated with movements of prices.
Conversely, exports of industrialized countries are diversiﬁed; thus, the production
of tradables and the exports in industrialized countries will be less likely to drop if
prices of a category of products decrease. Table 1 shows that the prices of commodity
exports4 have declined in general since the middle of the decade of the 90’s. The
only countries concerned by a rise in the export prices in the selected group are
oil producers; they beneﬁted from the oil price increases that happened in 1999
and continued in the beginning of the current decade. But the reversals observed,
before and after the latter Iraqi war, emphasize the uncertainty that features the
commodity price moves.
Drought is an another factor that could have a negative impact on the eco-
nomic activity. Contrary to the North, the African economies suﬀer frequently from
episodes of drought that aﬀect agricultural products. In general, African economies
are more likely to be aﬀected by adverse drought change than the industrialized ones
because of the agricultural sector importance in the national product. Guillaumont
et al. (1999) show that among primary instabilities, i.e structural in nature, the in-
stability of climate and terms of trade have negative inﬂuence on growth in Africa.
These factors are relevant because a ﬁxed exchange rate regime implies a constraint
on the use of exchange rate policy to stabilize the economy. It is admitted (Konate,
2001) that one reason for the devaluation of the CFA franc and the Comorian franc
observed in 1994 is the occurence of economic shocks African economies faced since
the mid-eighties, especially the decline of commodity prices. This feature is a kind of
structural asymmetry that we will retain for modeling an asymmetric ﬁxed exchange
rate arrangement.
In addition to a greater frequency of negative shocks in African economies than
in the industrialized ones, it is interesting to note the negative impact of political
instability on economic activity, especially on the economic growth. The instability
induces a lack of property rights protection; this could lead to a decrease of capital
accumulation as less investment is undertaken. Fosu (1992) argues that the same
decrease characterizes human capital accumulation because of the brain drain that
could occur due to the instability. He also argues that a breakdown in the level of
4It is the growth rate of commodity price index weighted by the share of retained products in
the global amount of commodity exports. For these countries the share of commodity in the total
export varies between 70% and 100 %.
7Table 1: Cumulated quarterly growth rate of Exports prices of selected African
countries from January 1995 to September 2002.
Benin Cameroon Congo Ivory Coast Gabon Guinea Mali Niger Togo
-17,9 26,0 53,8 -3,2 48,0 -25,5 -16,0 -23,0 -19,6
Source: Author calculation. Data from Thomson Financial Data.
GDP can be observed because the production process is likely to be interrupted dur-
ing episodes of severe crises like coups d’´ etat and revolutions. Moreover, a negative
impact of instability on growth can work through a deterioration of productivity.
Futhermore, we also invoke a negative correlation between instability and sound
economic policy which induces production declines in countries aﬀected by political
troubles. In times of trouble, three facts could be observed (Berth´ elemy et al.,
2002). First, politicians could avoid any structural reforms and pursue wait and
see policies in order to limit disagreement with the population and other political
parties. Secondly they could be confronted to a time inconsistency problem, failing
to keep their commitments in appropriate policies. Finally, corruption can become
a tool for threatened governments to ensure loyalty of various bodies. All these facts
could act negatively on the level of production as economic shocks appear.
Table 2: Political instability during the 1995-2003 period in CFA zone countries and
in non-CFA members of the Ecowas.
Country Coup d’´ etat Civil war Others
a Total number of years
CAR 2003 2001,2002, 2003 3
Chad 1998,2002,2003 3
Comoros 1999, 2000 1998 1998 3
Congo 1998 1998,1999 2
Ivory Coast 1999 2002, 2003 2000 4
Guinea 2000 1
Guinea Bissau 1999 2000 2
Liberia 1995-2003 2000 8
Nigeria 2003 1
Sierra Leone 1997 2000 1999 3
Source: Ecowas
a: riots, armed conﬂicts, elections with violence.
Empirically, this negative link between political instability and African economic
growth is clearly established (Barro, 1991; Guillaumont et al., 1999; Berth´ elemy
et al., 2002). For example, Guillaumont et al. (1999) ﬁnd that, as other primary
instabilities, political instability inﬂuences African growth through lowering the rate
of investment and appreciating the real ER. Studying 22 African countries’ data,
Berth´ elemy et al. (2002) also establish an unambiguous negative correlation between
instability and growth. It works through a negative impact on the capital accumu-
8lation and the productivity of investments.
In fact, we can notice an increasing political instability in Sub-Saharan Africa,
concerning the studied countries. Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) assimilate po-
litical instability to number of coups d’´ etat and ﬁnd that during the sub-period
1986-1993 there was on average a coup every 20 years in the WAEMU countries and
no coup at all in Ivory Coast, the biggest economy of the region. They also ﬁnd
no coup at all in the CAEMC countries during this period. Since the second half
of the preceding decade and the beginning of the current one, many major political
crises have arisen and some of these have still hold whether in the franc zone or in
the non-CFA countries ECOWAS members. Table 2 shows a selective distribution
of coup d’´ etat episodes, armed conﬂicts and civil war periods in the countries in
review since the end of the nineties. We see that the two monetary unions of the
franc zone and Comoros are characterized by a political instability, especially the
biggest economy of the WAEMU. This is of course a source of negative economic
shocks in the area.
3 The Model
A typical model of monetary policy credibility is presented here to illustrate the
multiplicity of equilibria featuring this kind of model. The next step will introduce
an operations account–like mechanism to show that the framework shifts to one of
unique equilibria; thus explaining why the zone franc has recorded such long periods
of unmodiﬁed ﬁxed parity. Without this institutional arrangement we will see that,
in the absence of an operations account mechanism, some asymmetries make the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime impossible to set up; unless to accept heavier constraint
on the ability to stabilize employment. The model describes a small open economy
in which a single tradable good is produced. The output is given by an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve:
yt = ¯ y + (πt − πe
t) + zt (1)
where ¯ y is the natural level of output, πt is the inﬂation rate, πe
t is the expected
inﬂation and zt is a productivity shock with zero mean and constant variance σ2.
We assume that the PPP holds and the inﬂation in the anchor country is zero, i.e,
π∗
t = 0. Thus, the inﬂation is determined by the depreciation rate of the exchange
rate, πt = et, the two variables becoming interchangeable. To keep the parity
unchanged in the ﬁxed exchange rate regime the DC policymaker has to manage the
monetary policy in such a way that πt = 0.
The policymaker minimizes the loss function:
L = (yt − ˜ y)
2 + χ(πt)
2 + C(ˆ e) (2)
where ˜ y is the output level targeted by the policymaker and is greater than the
natural level of output, ˜ y > ¯ y. There is a positive wedge between the output level
9targeted and the natural level such that k = ˜ y − ¯ y > 0. We assume that k > Z in
order to keep the intuition of the model more realistic5. The loss function depends
on deviations in output and inﬂation from the desired levels. It also depends on
a cost of reneging C(ˆ e) that creates an incentive for the policymaker to avoid any
change of the parity. For the moment, following Obstfeld (1997) and Rasmussen
(2002), we assume a ﬁxed term cost. When the ER remains ﬁxed (ˆ e = 0), there
will be no cost at all but any change of the ER (ˆ e  = 0) will imply a cost C(ˆ e) = ¯ c.
The discussion about the choice of a ﬁxed instead of a variable reneging cost is
postponed. Then, the following representation holds:
C(ˆ e) =
½
0 , if ˆ e = 0
c , if ˆ e  = 0.
(3)
3.1 Multiplicity of Equilibria Versus Existence of an Operation Ac-
count Mechanism
The monetary policymaker announces the exchange rate and engages himself to
maintain the parity unchanged. According to this announcement, the private sector
agents form their expectations before a productivity shock occurs. After the shock,
the choice of the actual ER regime is made by the monetary policymaker. He decides
either to support the parity or to renege and to let the currency ﬂoat with an induced
cost. The decision is based on the comparison of the actual losses stemming from
the possible ER choices. In fact, the choice of an exchange rate is equivalent to a
choice of the level of inﬂation. The choice of the inﬂation level in the case of ER
ﬂoating (with ˆ e  = 0) goes through the minimization of the following loss function
subject to πt:
Min Lt = (−k − πt − πe
t + zt)
2 + χ(πt)2 + c














2 + c (5)
If the choice of keeping the exchange rate ﬁxed prevails, i.e ˆ e = 0 and π = 0, the
loss will be:
L
FIX = (k + πe
t − zt)
2 (6)
5Rasmussen (2002) argues that k > Z implies that the analysis features only the cases where












FLEX, the ﬁxed ER regime will be chosen, otherwise the ﬂoating will
prevail. Thus, the decision about whether to pursue the peg or to renege will be







When private sector agents are convinced that the monetary policymaker will
pursue the peg, they expect a zero value inﬂation, i.e. πe = 0. Otherwise their
expectations of inﬂation are set in such a way that E(π) = πe = k
χ.
Alternatively, putting back the two expressions of inﬂation expectations in equa-
tion 7, we get two diﬀerent zone delimitations:
• In the case of a ﬂexible ER regime expectation, πe = k


















From the expression 7, it follows that for all random shock zt, given the structural
parameters k, χ and c, the solution of the model allows for multiple equilibria to
exist, depending on the expectations of the private sector. Indeed, there is a zone of
a unique equilibrium where the cost, c, is suﬃciently large to imply that the ﬁxed ER
regime will always prevail. Conversely, the cost of reneging could be so small that
the ﬂexible ER will be chosen. Between the two zones, we have a zone of multiple
equilibria in which πe = k
χ implies L
FIX > L
FLEX, leading to a switch to a ﬂoating
ER regime, while πe = 0 implies L
FIX < L
FLEX, inducing the maintenance of the
parity.




Note: A = 1









11The multiple equilibria of the intermediary zone, also highlighted by Obstfeld
(1997) and Rasmussen (2002), characterize the anti-inﬂationary policies based on
FER regimes whose credibility is questionable6.
But the CFA zone that has a lasting existence seems to be a credible monetary
arrangement in the sense that neither the collapse predicted by models nor massive
exit episode have occurred. Below, we will discuss to which extent an operations
account mechanism extends the stability of the ﬁxed ER regime by shifting the
multiple equilibria zone to a unique equilibrium one.
A consequence of the operation account is to convince economic agents that
the parity will be supported by the French Treasury, leading then to the absence of
inﬂationary pressure. Contrary to a normal (non-CFA) case in which the inﬂationary
expectations are either πe = k
χ when private agents expect the ﬂexible ER regime, or
πe = 0 when the ﬁxed ER is expected, we assume that the CFA case is characterized
by zero value expectations. Thus, in the CFA zone framework, the indeterminacy
zone becomes a ﬁxed ER zone, extending the range of reneging cost values that
allow to maintain the ER parity.
As documented above, the CFA zone has recorded ﬁxed ERs during a very long
time despite many periods during which the inﬂation in African countries was clearly
higher than in the anchor country. We argued that the key feature of this stability
is the virtual convertibility of African currencies due to the operations account.
Proposition 1 The operations account, by inducing a virtual convertibility of the
CFA franc, removes the uncertainty related to ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. It
extends the range of the reneging cost values that allow the maintaining of the
ER parity.
In fact, this result is an implication of having the ability to have an inﬂation
level above the one required by the PPP (π > 0), without any ER realignment. The
policymaker will be able to pursue inﬂationary policies while he avoids any related
cost and enjoys a stable ﬁxed ER setup. Indeed, ﬁgures 1 and 2 show many periods
during which inﬂation level in Africa is higher than in France.
3.2 Existence of Structural Asymmetries and Constraints of Fixed
Exchange Rate in the Absence of an Operations Account Mech-
anism
After relaxing the assumption of an operation account existence, the framework
used above can be extended to highlight the implications of asymmetries on the
constraint of pegging a currency. On the one hand, we assume that the anchor
country policymaker is more inﬂation averse than the one who pegs its currency.
On the other hand, we take into account that the general economic environment
in the anchor country is better than in the other. Moreover, we assume the same
6They argue that the multiplicity of equilibria bears a factor of instability that could lead to
speculative attacks. See also Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) and references therein.
12framework for the anchor and the pegging country while we allow for the PPP to
hold again. The PPP is, then, represented by ˆ e = π−π∗. The major diﬀerence with
the basic model is that now the inﬂation abroad is no more exogenously ﬁxed to zero
value. This zero value inﬂation is just a speciﬁc case of a more general framework in
which the anchor country policymaker optimally determines its inﬂation level like
the pegging country policymaker.
3.2.1 Asymmetric Aversion to Inﬂation
The argument developed here is an open economy version of the conservative central
banker issue initiated by Rogoﬀ (1985) and presented in a very simply way by
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996). We consider now that the monetary policymaker is
more inﬂation averse in the anchor country than in the pegging country, i.e. χ < χ∗.
The two loss functions are:
L∗ = (y∗
t − ˜ y∗)
2 + χ∗ (π∗
t)
2 (8)
L = (yt − ˜ y)
2 + χ(πt)
2 + C(ˆ e) (9)
There is no cost C(ˆ e) in the anchor country loss function as the level of in-
ﬂation can be chosen optimally without any constraint. The pegging policymaker
announces an ER he engages himself to keep ﬁxed in order to avoid a cost of reneging
deﬁned like in equation 3. The loss minimization process leads to equation 4 and
its anchor country equivalent. Solving for the expected inﬂation and dropping the









Putting back equation 11 in the equation 4 and doing the same for the anchor













As k — or k∗ — induces greater inﬂation level, it can be seen as the feature of
good (large k) and bad (weak k) fundamentals (see Obstfeld, 1996; Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ, 1996). However, it can also represent the ability to stabilize the employment
in the sense that a greater k means the ability to obtain a higher output level yt
without an additional loss by equation 9 and expression k = ˜ y−¯ y. In fact, its level is
simply the indication of the constraint of policy soundness related to monetary policy
13objectives. With the assumption of a symmetric supply shock z, the implications of
a ﬁxed ER can easily be analyzed if we assume that the PPP prevails. We have:



















Suppose that the two countries have the same ability to stabilize the employment,












Proposition 2. Asymmetric aversion to inﬂation implies diﬀerent abilities to sta-
bilize employment, the smaller being that of the pegging country. Thus, if a
structural change makes the anchor country policymaker have a greater aver-
sion to inﬂation than the pegging country one (χ < χ∗), the level of constraints
to maintain a ﬁxed ER will rise.
Proof. If χ = χ∗ — the case of a symmetric aversion to inﬂation — we will get
ˆ e = 0 with k∗ = k. We recall that k > Z. Therefore, since k and k∗ can
be interpreted as the abilities to stabilize employment, maintaining the parity
unchanged is possible with the same stabilization power. However, if we in-
troduce asymmetry and consider that χ < χ∗, k∗ will be greater than k to get
ˆ e = 0.
There are two facts interpreted as justifying a move from χ = χ∗ to χ < χ∗: the
disinﬂation process in the EMU and the “very low inﬂation” objective of the ECB. In
fact, the weaker ability to stabilize implied by this asymmetric aversion to inﬂation
for African country policymakers is an increase of the constraints of macroeconomic
performance required by a currency peg to the euro.
3.2.2 Asymmetric General Economic Environment
Now we consider the fact that the general economic environment is more favorable
to negative supply shocks in the pegging country than in the anchor country. For a
clear presentation of the argument, let us keep χ diﬀerent from χ∗ without excluding
the possibility of an equality between the two parameters. It is also assumed that
the two policymakers have a similar power of employment stabilization such that
k = k∗. We will show below that if the asymmetry prevails, a ﬁxity of the ER
is impossible unless we relax the assumption of stabilization power similarity. We
assume on the one hand that there are two diﬀerent random productivity shocks
zt−i and z∗
t−i with i = 0,1,2,...n and, on the other hand, that zt−i = z∗
t−i for i = 0.
Thus we have zt = z∗
t as above. In the anchor country, the productivity shock z∗
t has
a zero mean and a constant variance, while in the pegging country the probability
of occurrence of a negative shock −Z is greater than the probability related to a
positive shock Z. Then, the interesting implication for our analysis is the fact that
the mean can be deﬁned as: E(zt) = −ω. The mean is smaller than zero. Indeed,
the shocks are assumed to be similar in the two countries in period t even if they
are diﬀerently generated, that is, their means and variances are diﬀerent.
14The loss minimization process in the two countries leads to following expressions
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At this stage, we can notice the additional term in equation 16, ω > 0. It
represents the impact of a less sound global economic environment in the pegging
country. A higher level of expectations is a consequence of adverse events on the
credibility of a currency peg. The implication of this on the constraints of an ﬁxed















We can derive an expression of ER:



















Proposition 3. When a pegging country faces a worser general economic environ-
ment than the anchor country, a ﬁxed ER regime will be an unworkable setup
even if the actual economic shock is symmetric, unless the pegging policymaker
looses its ability to stabilize employment to some extent, i.e., k becoming lesser
than k∗.
Proof. By expression 19, a similar aversion to inﬂation (χ = χ∗) is no more a
suﬃcient condition to get a parity unchanged, i.e (ˆ e = 0), as in the subsection
3.2.1. Indeed, if χ = χ∗ the ER will depreciate (ˆ e = ω
χ+χ2 > 0). The only way
to get a ﬁxed ER regime is to consider that k < k∗.
This result seems to be usual in the sense that any attempt of ﬁxing the currency,
in order to obtain credibility, implies the loss of the monetary policy instrument.
However, we highlight an innovative feature of the Fixed ER model. Actually, we
clearly show that in addition to this loss of discretion in the monetary policy setup,
structural factors and non economic events, that are unmanageable by the pegging
15country policymaker, can make the ER regime more diﬃcult to undertake or to
pursue. Since the EMU advent is likely to imply more economic and political sta-
bility — while African countries are likely to face increasing negative globalization’s
externalities, still frequent political instability and various economic shocks —, we
think that pursuing a peg to the euro for CFA zone countries and setting up a ﬁxed
ER regime could have more constraints than before if the PPP prevails.
3.3 Intermediary Target of Monetary Policy: The Extent of Deval-
uation
Unlike Rasmussen (2002), Obstfeld (1996) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), we con-
sider here a linear cost of reneging that is a function of the extent of devaluation. It is
known that a devaluation implies inﬂationary pressures as it could entail an increase
of the imported goods prices, aﬀecting the general level of prices. The loss of private
agent purchasing power induced by the devaluation can undermine the credibility
of the monetary policymaker, leading to a rejection of the domestic currency. The
large the scale of devaluation, the higher is the level of the induced inﬂation and
possibly the deeper is the loss of credibility. The scale of the devaluation becomes
then a matter of concern.
In addition, a devaluation could be a sign of the weakness of external reserves
that policymakers are unwilling to reveal. In fact, a large devaluation scale is likely
to be interpreted as a sign of a very weak level of external reserves. Then, the scale
of devaluation is likely to have an impact on the ﬁnancial market agent’s perception
about the external reserves management.
Moreover, when international contracts — short term obligations — are ex-
pressed in a foreign currency (say, the euro), a large devaluation could be highly
damaging for the domestic ﬁnancial system as bankruptcies increase and banks’
loan portfolios deteriorate. Calvo (2000) states that “...this is the kind of considera-
tion that prompts the central bankers to avert major swings in the exchange rate.”.
Also in this case, the scale of devaluation becomes a matter of concern.
Let the cost of reneging in the pegging country become a linear function of
a devaluation extent, C(ˆ e) = β(ˆ e), while the anchor country one is again like in
equation 9. β is a coeﬃcient that expresses the weight of the extent of devaluation
in the loss function. The larger the devaluation, the higher will be the cost of
reneging. Here the loss function of the pegging country is:
L = (yt − ˜ y)
2 + χ(πt)
2 + β(ˆ e) (20)
where ˆ e = π−π∗, as the PPP works. We consider the two kind of asymmetries like in
Subsection 3.2, i.e., an asymmetric aversion to inﬂation (χ < χ∗) and the occurrence
of negative shocks (E(z) = −ω in the pegging country). Through the process of
minimization and after dropping the time subscript, we get the following expressions
for the expected and the optimal levels of inﬂation in the pegging country:




















χ + χ2 + 1
¶
(22)
Now we can see the implication of a linear cost of reneging on the FER regime
constraints and its impact on the consequences of structural asymmetries. We no-
tice that β enters in the equation 22 with a negative sign. If it increases, it will
lead to a decrease of the inﬂation level of the pegging country. Then for a given
level of inﬂation abroad (π∗), the greater the parameter β, the less is the extent of
devaluation. This result is partly due to the fact that private agents expectations of
inﬂation are reduced because of an additional incentive to ﬁght inﬂation related to
the level of devaluation. This can be observed by comparing the equation 11 with
the equation 21.
Proposition 4 A reform inducing the extent of devaluation as an intermediary
monetary policy target alleviates the additional constraints of structural asym-
metries because it induces greater ability to stabilize employment.
Proof To see this, let us combine ˆ e = 0 with equations 13 and 22 to get, after

























For an easy presentation consider ﬁrst that β equals to zero. If χ < χ or
ω > 0, k is obviously smaller than k∗. As β enters the equation with a minus
sign, the cost of reneging bears on the diﬀerence between k and k∗ in an
opposite way compared to the two kinds of asymmetries considered in our
framework. Hence, the greater the β, the dampened the consequences of the
asymmetries. In fact, while an asymmetric aversion to inﬂation (χ < χ∗) and a
worse economic environment in developing countries (ω > 0) make the pegging
country loose more ability to stabilize employment (k < k∗), the additional
incentives of the policymaker to avoid devaluation works in the opposite sense.
Indeed, the greater the β, the lower is the diﬀerence between k and k∗.
Hence, introducing the extent of the ER variation as an explicit intermediary
monetary policy’s target is likely to increase the credibility and to also ease the
burden of pegging a currency despite the presence of asymmetries. At the same
time, when considering the third term of the second member of equation 23, it could
be noticed that the impact of β is dampened if χ is high. Then, any reform that
could work as an introduction of a linear cost of reneging will have little impact if
the country or the monetary union has a strong aversion to inﬂation yet.
174 The Future of the Franc Zone and Alternative Mone-
tary Arrangements in Africa
In this section, we continue the current debate on the future of the franc zone taking
into account the insights of our framework. The ﬁrst issue tackled is whether the
current framework of the franc zone could be safely maintained. On the institutional
level, the French government has obtained from the other members of the EMU that
the French Treasury continues to provide external reserves through the operations
account mechanism. The zone agreements hold at the members own discretion
except for the case of a new entrance or a fundamental change of the agreement.
The induced virtual convertibility of the CFA franc and the Comorian franc worked
in favor of a very long period of stability, avoiding the predictable collapse of the
regime. In fact, the 1994 devaluation could be seen as an indication of the franc
zone evolution. We can consider that this system has migrated to a more classical
one in which currency devaluation becomes possible. Then, even if the status quo
could be maintained, it is important to keep in mind that two facts make it risky:
On the one hand, the greater post-1994 likelihood to devaluate the CFA franc and
the Comorian franc implies a higher probability of instability episodes occurrence7
for the zone as a consequence of the multiplicity of equilibria we underlined above.
Indeed, the aftermath of the latter devaluation episode is featured by very good
subsequent macroeconomic performances till 1999, even after 1999 in some CFA
countries of Central Africa. The devaluation now appears to be a more serious
alternative of the monetary policy. This implies that, contrary to the situation
before 1994, African policymakers have to engage themselves in sounder policies as
they no longer have the possibility of recording an inﬂation level above the anchor
economy one without a fear of devaluation. On the other hand, the asymmetries
invoked in our model are likely to make the anchorage to the euro more diﬃcult to
pursue. The anti-inﬂationary biased policy objectives of the ECB and the greater
political and economic instability in African countries are the main reason of the
expected asymmetries.
In regards to alternatives aside the status quo there is the ECOWAS project,
whose the building process is running. Masson and Patillo (2001a) argue that, if
the project continues to go forward, a key element will be the setup of rules, in-
stitutions and mutual surveillance that have to lead to eﬀective restraints for ﬁscal
policies. They suggest (Masson and Patillo, 2001b) that, with appropriate reforms,
the ECOWAS members are likely to achieve ER stability through an informal mon-
etary union like the earlier EMS in Europe. However, non-WAEMU members of
the ECOWAS are determined to achieve a formal monetary union with a precise
agenda. The relevant issue that stems from this position is whether to peg or not a
common currency to the euro ? The anchorage of the future common currency to the
7The relation between the multiplicity of equilibria and the instability of a FER is clearly stressed
in the related literature. See for example Rasmussen (2002), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) and the
references therein.
18euro, if decided, will make the system work like a classical monetary zone — prob-
ably without the operations account mechanism8. As we argued above, structural
asymmetries are likely to make the framework more restrictive for macroeconomic
policies than before the nineties. Thus, if we consider the poor inﬂation records in
non-WAEMU countries of the ECOWAS and the frequent excess of inﬂation level in
the WAEMU compared to that of the anchor country, it seems to us that reforms
and rules without an anchor could be better. The same conclusion will hold for the
CAEMC if the members decide to form an autonomous monetary union, out of the
CFA zone.
Although, if the ECOWAS members choose a formal monetary union with a
single currency pegged to the euro — as well as if country pegs its currency to the
euro — , the independence of the central bank and the introduction of intermediate
objectives of monetary policies — especially the extent of the devaluation — will
appear to be interesting features to implement as suggested by our framework. Fol-
lowing, for example, the optimal contracts argument of Walsh (1995), we suggest
that, if currency anchorage to the euro prevails, political authorities should ensure
the central bank independence and should give to the central banker more incentives
in order to obtain better inﬂation performance along with less employment stabi-
lization restraint, despite the existing structural asymmetries. There could be a
clause included in the central bank governor’s employment contract that makes the
appointment related to the extent of devaluation. This is an intuitive counterpart
of the linear cost of reneging in our two country monetary framework.
Another issue to deal with is the heterogeneity of countries in the ECOWAS.
Whatever the form of monetary cooperation will prevail, one of the most important
points is the setup of substantial structural reforms in order to achieve central bank
independence, better mutual surveillance or ﬁscal restraints. But in the case of a
formal monetary union, the type and the extent of institutional or structural changes
could be irrelevant for some country members. Indeed, we noticed in ﬁgures 2 and
3 that the inﬂation record is not the same in WAEMU countries compared to the
non-WAEMU ones. This could be the result of franc zone memberships or simply —
perhaps because of the former reason — a structural diﬀerence in those countries’
aversion to inﬂation.
An asymmetric economic shock also raises the heterogeneity issue. Actually, as
a possible devaluation of the CFA franc is invoked in order to deal with the current
economic crisis in the WAEMU (Konate, 2001), an improvement of the economic
growth and some macroeconomic performance indicators is observed in the CAEMC
member’s economy. The uniqueness of the CFA franc exchange rate becomes, then,
questionable not only for diﬀerent monetary unions in a zone, but also for various
countries in the same monetary unions. Looking for some ﬂexibility in the reforms
to undertake is therefore an interesting caution.
Consequently, introducing the extent of ER change in the intermediary targets
8It seems to us that French Treasury could be reluctant to oﬀer such a virtual convertibility to
the whole ECOWAS including a large country like Nigeria.
19list of the monetary policy — for example, through an optimal contracts mechanism
— will not necessarily have a great impact. One should carefully evaluate the true
willingness to ﬁght inﬂation before the introduction of a such reform. Suppose that
we interpret χ of our model as an average aversion of inﬂation in a monetary zone.
Countries that were initially more inﬂation averse have less interest to undertake such
reforms. Actually, if the expected ECOWAS monetary union is accomplished, the
setup of rules must take into account the possible diﬀerence in structural patterns
of inﬂation performance. The convergence criteria established by non-CFA (non-
WAEMU) countries as a step in the monetary union implementation is an indication
that African policymakers are aware of this heterogeneity issue.
5 Conclusion
We have used a standard simple model of credibility in monetary policy to investi-
gate some possible implications of the euro advent and the process that led to this
advent for the African countries. The main issue was two fold: to which extent
maintaining a peg to the euro as it replaced the French franc for the CFA zone and
setting up a new ﬁxed exchange rate regime for ECOWAS members are feasible in
the presence of asymmetries? We highlighted some evidence on the possible exis-
tence of structural asymmetries in the macroeconomic performances and the general
economic environment that characterize the EMU and African countries. Then, the
analysis leads to the following insights: ﬁrst, the virtual convertibility of African
currencies induced by the operations account mechanism explains why a predictable
collapse of the FER arrangement failed to be accomplished, allowing the CFA zone
to exist till now. Secondly, we have shown that, without the rigid application of
the operations account mechanism, the constraint of pegging to the euro could have
been increased with the disinﬂation process that preceded its advent. Moreover, we
underlined the heavy constraint due to a bad political and economic environment
that is now linked to the use of the euro as an anchor. To be aware of this will
help to set up appropriate economic and political reforms necessary to the choice of
the euro as a monetary anchor. Finally, we found that among reforms to set up, it
could be more interesting to increase the central bank independence. Furthermore,
giving an additional incentive to ﬁght inﬂation through an intermediary target of
monetary policy like the extent of devaluation could also be a good decision. This
could be achieved through optimal central banker contracts.
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